Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Self-consciousness, philosophy: self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that allows a localization of the thinking subject in the logical space. The prerequisite for self-consciousness is consciousness of external and internal processes as well as the ability to differentiate between these two sources of influences. See also identification, self-identification, self, I, consciousness, individuation, identity, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
David M. Armstrong on Self- Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 62 Selfconsciousness/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: self-consciousness is a perception of our own mind. NagelVsArmstrong: psychological states are not perceived, but "directly experienced". ShoemakerVsArmstrong: self consciousness is no perception, it can not be seen from reflection that it is me. >Self-Identification, >Perception, >Self-Knowledge/Psychological theories._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |